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This article analyses the effect that the changing preferences of European electorates during the 
Great Recession has had on party offer in regions characterised by a historically salient centre-
periphery conflict. Scholarly research on the emergence of a ‘new politics’ (Hutter et al. 2017) 
agenda has focused the analysis primarily at the national and supranational (i.e. European) 
levels, leaving the subnational level under-explored. In this article, we want to fill this gap while 
contributing to the larger discussion about the virtues and/or vices of regionalisation for 
democratic representation in Europe (Däubler et al. 2017). 
The political crisis in the shadow of the Great Recession contributed to processes of change 
in many Western European party systems. While the modification of electoral alignments in 
some countries favoured the extant populist radical left and right, in others it led to the rise of 
new parties campaigning against the political establishment and for a regeneration of 
democracy. Their transformative agenda has resonated with voters, who, having removed their 
trust in establishment parties1, voted in considerable numbers for these new politics parties 
(Hobolt and Tilley 2016). According to previous research (Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Hutter et 
al. forthcoming; Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2017), voters punish establishment parties for their 
contribution to bring about the Great Recession, but also, and more fundamentally, voters show 
a deeper dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy. As a result, the regeneration of 
democracy has been successfully incorporated onto the political agendas of many European 
countries (Hutter et al. 2017). 
 
1 Following Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (forthcoming), we define political establishment parties as ‘those 
historical centre-left and centre-right parties that have dominated the political agenda during the post-
WWII period and have, therefore, been key actors in the design of the existing national and European 
institutions, either as incumbent parties or as the main opposition in parliament’. Eurobarometer survey 
results between 2007, 2010 and 2016 show the low and decreasing trust towards political parties in the 
three countries under analysis: While in Spain 32% of respondents trusted political parties in 2007, the 
number fell to 11% in 2010 and further to 10% in 2016. Although smaller in absolute terms, the fall of 
trust in Italy, from 16% in 2007 and 2010 to 9% in 2016, is also dramatic, particularly given the already 
low level of trust to begin with. Trust in parties was also very low in United Kingdom before the onset 
of the crisis in 2007, 15%, and has remained almost unchanged for the following ten years (13% in 2010, 
14% in 2016). (Source: Eurobarometer n. 68, 74, 86). 
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It is our contention here that this challenge to the political establishment does not only take 
place at the national level but also at the subnational one (regional and local2). Establishment 
parties have been losing votes in regional and local elections across Europe while new parties 
campaigning for the need to regenerate democracy have established themselves as permanent 
features of subnational party systems (Hobolt and Tilley 2016). Who are these establishment 
parties at the regional level? That hinges upon the structure of political conflict that exists in 
each country and, within each country, in each region. 
In politically decentralised countries with a salient centre-periphery conflict, such as those 
under analysis in this article, the regional branches of state-wide parties share the political space 
with the regionalist party family, whose positions along the centre-periphery dimension spread 
from regionalism and autonomism to separatist nationalism (Alonso 2012). In the last two to 
three decades these parties moved ‘from protest to power’ (Elias and Tronconi 2011), often 
reaching governing status and becoming key players, at both the regional and national levels 
(Schakel and MAssetti 2017). Challengers in the past, they are now being in turn challenged by 
the electoral growth of new parties born in the shadow of the Great Recession to defend an 
intense anti-establishment agenda. How have establishment parties reacted to the emergence of 
this new politics agenda in regions characterised by complex bi-dimensional political spaces? 
Has the change in voters’ preferences been picked up and acted upon by regional party systems? 
What has been the response of regionalist parties, the old challengers, to this new challenge? 
These are the questions that this article aims to answer. 
To do so, we compare peripheral regions across three West European countries – namely 
Italy, Spain and United Kingdom, where the centre-periphery cleavage is highly salient (Alonso 
2012; Elias et al. 2015) and where changes in electoral alignments are transforming partisan 
 
2 New politics parties govern many important cities of Italy and Spain, including the capitals. 
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politics (Bosco and Verney 2016; Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Kriesi 2014). We analyse the 
period between 2007 and 2016, which captures the evolution of the Great Recession, from its 
origin in the global financial meltdown at the end of 2007 to the present. Within this ten-year 
period, 2010 marks a turning point. This is the year when the sovereign debt crisis broke out, 
marked by the first bailout of a Eurozone country, Greece. The story has been told many times3. 
What matters for our argument are its consequences. The economic interventions of the so-
called Troika in several Eurozone countries between 2010 and 2013 limited national 
governments autonomy to make fiscal policy decisions, being bound by the signature of 
Memoranda of Understanding to implement harsh internal devaluation programs (Armingeon 
et al. 2016; Copelovitch et al. 2016). Calls to democratic regeneration at the national and 
European levels for greater responsiveness and less technocracy, against the Troika and in 
favour of national sovereignty and the ‘will of the people’, seemed far more plausible after 
2010. 
The aim here is to conduct a pioneering exploration by following our intuition that 
establishment parties at the regional level react to the transformation of partisan politics by 
emphasizing issues of democratic regeneration and making electoral use of them in regional 
party competition. We thus, on the one hand, confirm further the strategic capacity of regionalist 
actors to strategise beyond centre-periphery issues, as already demonstrated by other studies 
(Alonso 2012; Massetti 2009; Zuber 2012) and, on the other hand, show the effects of the 
transformation of partisan politics at the sub-national level leading to the increased relevance 
of democratic regeneration in party competition. 
The article is structured as follows. We first introduce the theoretical background regarding 
subnational party positioning on issues of democratic regeneration. This leads us to the 
 
3 See Copelovitch et al. (2016) for an excellent chronology and analysis. 
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expectations that will guide our comparative analysis. The fourth section introduces our data, 
operationalisation, and relevant cases. In the empirical sections, five and six, we present our 
main findings. We conclude with a discussion of our comparative analysis and the implications 
of the results for future research. 
Economic crisis and party competition on democratic regeneration 
The relationship between economy and party system stability in old and new democracies 
constitutes a classic subject of analysis in political science (Thomassen 1990). Although we do 
not know exactly if more economic development increases stability, we do know that economic 
hardship encourages the instability of party systems as voters hold incumbents responsible for 
the course of the economy and try to find new political alternatives (Casal Bértoa 2014: 5). In 
contrast to times of ‘normal politics’, when the traditional opposition constitutes the alternative 
(economic voting), a major economic crisis like the European Great Recession constitutes a 
‘critical juncture’ whereby the whole political establishment is under threat, thus accelerating 
pre-existing long-term processes of party system change (Hernández and Kriesi 2016: 204). 
The rise of new parties during the Great Recession is strongly linked to the erosion of the 
established parties’ representation function (Mair 2013). The limitation of the old parties’ 
capacity to sustain their political offer based on the traditional political conflicts contributed to 
the generation of anti-elitist feelings among Western European electorates. In some countries 
the disaffection with the ‘old’ political class has been channelled by the new populist 
phenomenon of the ‘anti-party’, which is mobilizing around the rejection of the party system 
as a whole (Kriesi 2014: 370). While the most striking example is surely Grillo’s Five Star 
Movement (M5S) in Italy, also other contexts show that the upsurge of new forces is best 
explained by the lack of confidence in political institutions, as Orriols and Cordero (2016) 
confirm for Podemos and Ciudadanos in Spain. 
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Hutter et al. (2017) conceptualise the political space that followed the 2007 outbreak of the 
Great Recession as constituted by two ‘overlapping conflicts’: the conflict with the domestic -
national- elites and the conflict with the European -EU- elites, each one having in turn a political 
and an economic component. The conflict with European elites is based on the EU’s 
management of the financial crisis and the EU’s democratic deficit. The concrete issues, 
however, may differ across countries. In Southern Europe, it is mainly about ending the Troika-
imposed austerity and its conditions; in Great Britain it is more about the lack of economic 
policy autonomy brought about by the Stability and Growth Pact. In all cases, on the other hand, 
it is about taking back national sovereignty and democratizing European decision-making.  
The conflict with EU elites spills over to the national level. In the economic realm, the 
conflict over EU-imposed austerity translates into the domestic arena in terms of the old 
socioeconomic left-right dimension. The issues here concern the (fair) distribution of the 
economic costs of the crisis and the regulation of markets. At the same time, the loss of national 
sovereignty caused by EU and Euro membership triggers calls for taking it back. In Southern 
Europe, moreover, corruption and clientelism have aggravated the already deficient response 
of the political establishment to the sovereign debt crisis. The perception of corruption coupled 
with the limited manoeuvring space of national governments has increased the distrust towards 
both domestic and European political institutions (Muro and Vidal 2017) and fuelled the 
electoral challenge represented by new parties. 
To sum up, new politics or the regeneration of democratic practices is not just about 
politics, but also about the economy: it comes, so to speak, with a call for economic policies 
that are more responsive to the needs of the people, not the elites, and that are based on 
deliberation by the people, not on the opinion of experts and/or unelected institutions. This is 
reflected in an emphasis on (anti)austerity and democratic regeneration when addressing both 
national and European elites (Hutter et al. 2017). 
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New politics and regional party competition 
Countries with a salient centre-periphery cleavage are characterised by a complex space of 
political competition. The traditional left-right conflict has evolved alongside, either cross-
cutting or overlapping, a centre-periphery dimension (Alonso 2012; Elias et al. 2015; Massetti 
2009). This complexity is compounded by the multilevel structure of the state and its effects on 
the national and subnational party systems. In regional and local elections, the subnational 
branches of state-wide parties compete with territorially bounded regional and local parties for 
the support of voters. As a result, party systems in regions with a salient centre-periphery 
conflict are more fragmented than elsewhere in the country, making government formation 
more complex and coalition governments more common (Van Haute and Deschouwer 2017). 
Regionalist parties are parties whose political agenda is the defence of a distinctive territory 
inside the state (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). They constitute the regionalist party family since 
they are all rooted in the centre-periphery cleavage, defined ‘as the conflict over the political 
control over a (peripheral) territory’ (Alonso 2012: 25). A second feature that distinguishes 
them from regional branches of state-wide parties is the exclusive organisation in their 
peripheral territory (Alonso et al. 2017). It has been widely demonstrated, in response to the 
niche party thesis (Meguid 2008), that many regionalist parties do not limit their appeal to 
centre-periphery issues but instead complement their territorial self-government goals with the 
position and emphasis on a different set of economic and other issues (Alonso 2012; Gross and 
Debus 2017; Massetti and Schakel 2015). 
Regarding the political conflict around democratic regeneration, the emergence of 
challenger parties at the national level has had its counterpart at the regional one. Regionalist 
parties have emerged that combine, with no apparent difficulty, a pro-periphery agenda (that 
goes from enhanced self-government to outright separatism) with a new politics worldview, 
critical of the political and economic establishment (see section 5). 
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Given the empirically demonstrated strategic nature of regionalist parties, and their status 
as ‘establishment’ parties in many regions, we expect them to react to the emergence of new 
challengers by accommodating their agendas to those of their competitors (Alonso 2012). On 
the other hand, the regional branches of state-wide parties are also expected to react strategically 
to the growth of new politics parties by addressing issues of democratic regeneration in electoral 
contests. Ignoring new politics would be too risky for establishment parties, regionalist and 
state-wide alike, particularly in the context of the Great Recession. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis runs as follows: 
(H1) The electoral growth of challenger parties defending agendas of democratic regeneration 
in regional elections will eventually lead to the increased salience of these issues in the regional 
space of political competition. 
As a result, the whole space of political competition will be transformed. However, this process 
against the secondary nature of regional dynamics will be more than a mere reflection of the 
changes unfolding at the national level and will depend on how parties combine new politics 
issues with the other salient dimensions to form regionally-specific ‘issue packages’4. Despite 
some general trends that are likely to exist across regions, we expect different combinations of 
new politics and the two other main regional dimensions of competition, the left-right and the 
centre-periphery cleavage. 
Likewise, we also expect variations across types of parties in the way new politics is 
combined with other issue dimensions to conform the party’s image. The new challengers are 
expected to emphasise to a comparatively larger degree new politics issues, i.e. democratic 
 
4 We follow here Alonso et al.’s (2017) use of the notion of ‘issue package’. According to it, parties use 
their programmatic saliencies and positions strategically along a wide range of issue dimensions. The 
assumption is that there is more than one way to convey a pro- or anti- position along one particular 
conflict dimension by combining issues belonging to different dimensions. This issue package is what 
conveys to the electorate a particular party ‘image’.  
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regeneration, whereas the old establishment parties are expected to respond to the challenge by 
engaging with the economic aspects linked to new politics (as demonstrated by Hutter et al. 
forthcoming), i.e. the conflict over the distribution of the costs of the crisis. The reason behind 
this is party credibility. Convincing the electorate that a party will reform institutional 
procedures to make them more democratic, to reduce corruption, and to increase the 
‘sovereignty of the people’ will be difficult for establishment parties that have been steering the 
political life of a country for decades, either as incumbents or as main opposition. It would be 
more likely that a party having a ‘clean record’ exploits these issues (Bågenholm and Charron 
2014: 906). The economic aspects, by contrast, can be more credibly handled by old 
establishment parties, since they can use strategies of blame avoidance that redirect blame for 
economic outcomes onto European institutions, international markets and globalisation. 
Therefore, our second hypothesis says that: 
(H2) For reasons of partisan credibility, old establishment parties will accommodate the 
democratic regeneration agendas of new challenger parties indirectly, by emphasizing the 
economic aspects of new politics to a larger degree than the more political ones.  
The implication of H2 is that the difference between establishment and new parties is larger 
than the difference between regionalist and state-wide parties. In other words, irrespective of 
which category establishment parties in the region belong to (state-wide or regional) they will 
be more similar amongst them than with respect to new parties, whether these are state-wide or 
regional. Thus, the regionalist party family will be divided by the new politics conflict 
dimension as much as it was divided in the past by the left-right conflict dimension (Alonso 
2012; Alonso et al. 2015; Massetti and Schakel 2015). 
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Measuring new politics in parties’ regional-level manifestos 
This article uses data from the content analysis of parties’ electoral manifestos to measure the 
salience of new politics in regional elections. More concretely, we rely on the data of the 
Regional Manifestos Project (RMP). The content-analysis methodology used by the RMP is an 
adaptation of the Manifesto Research on Political Representation’s (MARPOR) content-
analysis classification scheme, developed for the analysis of multilevel polities. This adaptation 
is described and explained in Alonso et al. (2013). 
We rely on Hutter et al.’s (forthcoming) conceptualisation of the new politics conflict 
dimension and its relationship with economic issues, already introduced in section 2. In this 
section we proceed to operationalise it using RMP salience scores. Table 1 shows the policy 
issues that belong to the new politics and the economic austerity conflict dimensions. New 
politics is constituted by issues that relate to the betterment of democracy in general and to 
representative and/or participative democratic institutions in particular. Also included are all 
references critical of corruption. Finally, European integration is an important element of new 
politics for it addresses the supra-national institutional environment in which existing European 
national democracies are embedded. Both positive and negative mentions of European 
integration belong to the new politics dimension because new politics party challengers are not 
necessarily anti-EU but can also be anti-existing EU and pro-renewed EU. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The same logic applies to the second conflict over economic austerity. Being translated 
into the core conflict between the market and the state, it comprises two different views on 
tackling economic hardship. The market represents the arena of complete economic freedom 
(categories 401, 407, 414) and the state represents the intervention of government on the 
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economy to guarantee a more equal distribution of wealth (categories 403, 404, 406, 409, 412). 
Austerity policies belong to category 414 and 407, whereas anti-austerity would be addressed 
by categories 409 and 406. Hutter et al. (forthcoming) include welfare issues in this dimension 
but we disagree with this since welfare policy issues, at least at the regional level, are part of 
the old establishment parties’ manifestos and their traditional issue package5. Moreover, 
welfare issues do not serve to differentiate between left- and right-wing parties because welfare 
is highly mentioned by parties across the ideological spectrum, as already demonstrated by 
Benoit and Däubler (2014). 
The salience of new politics issues in party manifestos is calculated as the percentage of 
quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the aforementioned categories. Theoretically, the 
salience of new politics ranges from 0, for a party manifesto that completely ignores the 
dimension, to 100, for a party manifesto that dedicates all its sentences to it. Empirically, 
however, the range in our data set goes from 0.28% (Scottish Labour Party in 2011) to 22.91% 
(M5S Trentino in 2013). 
We are also interested in two other major political conflicts that have been present in the 
regions under analysis at least since WWII (Alonso 2012): the left-right and the centre-
periphery dimensions. An established, though no doubt controversial, way of measuring the 
salience of the left-right dimension in the literature is using the right-left (RILE) variable, the 
operationalisation developed by the MARPOR team and whose categories are listed in the 
Appendix. The problem with RILE is that some of its categories are also used to define the 
economic austerity conflict. For this reason, we will use them alternatively in the analysis, never 
 
5 The relation between the salience of the centre-periphery cleavage and the active promotion of 
subnational systems of welfare governance is clear. Territorial mobilisation has favoured the process of 
welfare building at the sub-state level with regionalist parties using social policies to emphasise the 
distinctiveness of their territories (Vampa 2016). What further matters for our argument is that the 
imposed fiscal constraints during the Great Recession have reinforced this discourse in their challenge 
against the central-state. Alonso et al. (2017) show the high attention to welfare issues in old regionalist 
parties’ post-crisis election manifestos. 
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together. To measure the salience of the centre-periphery dimension we shall use the 
operationalisation developed by the RMP’s team, and whose categories are also shown in the 
Appendix. 
Our main empirical indicators throughout this article are salience scores. Salience scores 
have both an absolute and a relative meaning (Alonso 2012). Concerning the former, we need 
to know what the salience scores mean in terms of the absolute degree of attention that parties’ 
manifestos give to the different issue dimensions. In other words, we need some yardstick 
defining what high- and low-salience scores are. For this purpose, following Alonso (2012), we 
have calculated the mean salience score of the 76 policy categories in our three countries under 
study. This value is 1.3, with a standard deviation of 2.19. Any policy category whose salience 
score is 1.3% or more is considered to receive a salient degree of attention by parties in their 
electoral manifestos. Therefore, when the salience score of the new politics or economic 
austerity conflict dimensions is below 1.3 % of mentions, we can say that the party manifesto 
is ignoring these issues. 
Concerning the relative meaning, our interest is not the absolute salience score of each 
dimension but the relative weight that each dimension represents over the whole manifesto. For 
this, we calculate the ratio between the salience scores of the two dimensions being compared: 
the new politics dimension, which is our dimension of interest, and the reference dimension. 
Ratios larger than 1 indicate that the new politics dimension is more important in the party 
manifestos than the reference dimension; ratios lower than 1 indicate the opposite. The larger 
than 1 the ratio, the more important the new politics dimension is relative to the reference 
dimension; the lower than 1 the ratio, the less important the new politics dimension is relative 




Italy, Spain and Great Britain are asymmetrically decentralised states, where some regions have 
a higher level of self-government than others. This asymmetry is the result of a historically 
successful politicisation of the centre-periphery conflict by regionalist and/or nationalist parties. 
Therefore, our analysis focuses on those regions with a higher level of self-government, 
characterised by the presence of politically relevant regionalist parties competing for votes side 
by side with the regional branches of state-wide parties. 
Our data cover 33 parties (24 regionalist and 9 state-wide parties), 8 of which are new 
politics challenger parties, operating in 13 regions (4 regions in Italy, 7 in Spain and 2 in Great 
Britain). Table A2 in the Appendix shows the full list of regions and parties in our dataset. 
Regionalist and state-wide parties have been categorised according to the above definition that 
separates them from each other, i.e. roots in the centre-periphery conflict and territorial 
organisation. Pertaining to both categories, new politics challenger parties have been identified 
as those parties that commonly share a fierce anti-establishment rhetoric and were created 
and/or gained representation at the subnational level only in the aftermath of the European Great 
Recession (i.e. after 2007). 
Our argument on the transformation of political spaces applies only to establishment 
parties: those that have been a long-term feature of the regional party system, with long 
governing -or opposition- experience. Established parties have incentives to react to new 
challengers as they have electoral, organisational, and institutional interests to protect. Smaller 
parties do not. Given the relative smaller size that characterises regionalist parties, we apply 
Massetti’s (2009) minimum electoral relevance criterion, which consists in selecting parties 
that have elected representatives to the regional assembly on at least three consecutive 
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occasions. Regarding state-wide establishment parties, we consider the two largest ones in their 
respective countries6. 
The new politics party challengers in Italy, Spain and Great Britain: A general 
overview 
New challenger parties are the driving forces behind the transformation of the political spaces 
in times of crisis (Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Hutter et al. forthcoming). While the challenge to 
the establishment is their common feature, the parties analysed in this article raise specific 
policy demands and differ in organisation as well as in their historical background. 
Founded in 2009 the Italian M5S has been labelled as the best example of the new ‘anti-
party’ (Kriesi 2014) stating to neither be left nor right and contraposing Italian citizens against 
the corrupt elites. It claims that power can be given back to the citizens through online direct 
democracy, which is also a new main feature of party organisation (Ceccarini and Bordignon 
2016). Relying on direct democracy in the fight against the establishment is also a central point 
in the programme of Podemos in Spain, which grew out of the 15M social movement and first 
contested elections in 2014. Although adopting a M5S-like neither-left-nor-right strategy in 
order to appeal to the ‘social majority’, the party can be clearly placed on the left, competing 
against its right-wing counterpart Ciudadanos (Citizens, C’s). Founded in 2006 as a Catalonian 
anti-nationalist party, its take-off outside Catalonia started in the 2015 regional elections 
(Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio 2016). Unlike M5S, Podemos and C’s, the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) is an ‘old’ challenger, existing since 1993, but entering mainstream 
politics only after 2009. Adopting an open Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant position, it has been 
characterised as part of a broader European populist radical right (Ford et al. 2012). 
 
6 Because of the dissolution of the Italian main centre-right coalition Popolo della Libertà (PdL) and the 
little relevance of state-wide centre-right parties in the selected regions, we only included manifestos of 
the Democratic Party. 
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New politics party challengers exist also at the regional level. They all campaign for a 
regeneration of democracy but can also be clearly placed on the (far) left of the political 
spectrum. The Galician Alternative Left (AGE) and the Valdostan Autonomy Freedom 
Participation and Ecology (ALPE), are splinters from the historically dominant regionalist 
parties (Galician Nationalist Bloc -BNG- and Valdostan Union -UV- respectively) and form 
coalitions with regional green parties. The other Valdostan party, Progressive Valdostan Union 
(UVP), also split from the UV in 2013, adopting a similar stance to ALPE, with whom it formed 
an electoral coalition. The Catalan Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) differs from the others in 
its historical background, which can be traced back to the Spanish democratic transition. Since 
then the party promoted its anti-capitalist, ecologist, and municipalist platform contesting 
elections only at the local level until 2012, when it entered the regional political scene. Despite 
their common emphasis on democratic regeneration and far left positions, these regionalist 
parties differ in their centre-periphery positioning. While the Spanish regionalist challengers 
combine their democratic regeneration claims with secessionist positions, the Italian regionalist 
challengers display autonomist stances. 
The electoral fortunes of these new challengers have varied across party types. The 
regionalist challengers generally obtained remarkable electoral results from the beginning (see 
Table A3 in the Appendix). Being organised at the national level, the electoral fortunes of the 
state-wide challengers are more diverse across electoral levels and regions. Whereas the M5S 
became the largest party at its debut on the national stage in 2013 with 25.6%, at the regional 
level it only gradually consolidated itself as a third force behind the traditional centre-left and 
right (from an average of 3.3% in 2010 to 16.3% in 2015). The territorial distribution of M5S 
vote shares ranges from 2.5% in South Tyrol to 22.3% in Liguria, thus showing a large diversity 
across regions (Scantamburlo and Pallaver 2014; Vampa 2015). Similarly, the UKIP in 2014 
became the largest party at the European level with 27%, whereas at the regional level it 
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achieved representation for the first time in Wales in 2016, when it nearly trebled its share of 
votes compared to 2011 (from 4.7% to 12.5%). Podemos and C’s were much more successful 
in their first regional challenge against the Spanish two-party system, achieving 20% of the 
regional vote and entering all regional parliaments at the 2015 regional elections. Moreover, 
they proved decisive in forming regional governments in 10 out of the 17 Spanish autonomous 
communities, whether via investiture agreements or legislative pacts (Gómez and Urquizu 
2015). 
Let us turn now to challenger parties’ programmatic agendas. Figure 1 presents the salience 
scores of the major conflict dimensions in new challenger parties’ manifestos. The salience of 
new politics issues in challenger parties’ manifestos ranges from 9.4% in UKIP to 18% in M5S. 
The left-right dimension, on the other hand, shows a range between 15.7% (UKIP) and 47% 
(AGE) whereas the centre-periphery dimension moves between 1.85% and 13%. Some patterns 
emerge from these results. The new politics dimension shows the smallest diversity, meaning 
that these parties are more similar in terms of the emphasis they give to democratic regeneration 
than in relation to the other two dimensions of competition. At the same time, state-wide parties 
dedicate considerably less space in their manifestos to the centre-periphery conflict than 
regionalist parties, as is to be expected. The left-right dimension presents the largest diversity 
of the three. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
A look into the relative weight of the new politics dimension relative to the economic 
austerity dimension shows a clear picture in favour of new politics (Figure 2). In all cases except 
the Catalan CUP, challenger parties give more relative weight to the new politics dimension 
than to issues concerning economic austerity. Clearly, it is democratic regeneration that they 
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are most preoccupied with, not economic justice. UKIP, Podemos, M5S and UVP emphasise 
the new politics dimension more than twice as much as the economic austerity one. In the other 
cases, the relative weight is more balanced, although always clearly in favour of the new politics 
dimension. The only case in which the economic austerity dimension is more salient than the 
new politics one is the CUP. This makes sense in terms of this party’s historical background as 
a far-left party. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Responding to new politics challengers: the transformation of regional political 
spaces 
In the previous section, we have briefly introduced the programmatic agenda of new politics 
challenger parties. In this section, we are going to analyse the response of establishment parties 
to this new development in their respective regions. We have divided the sample into two 
periods marked by the year 2010. The year 2010, as we already explained, marks a temporal 
tipping point after which establishment parties can no longer ignore the newly emerging 
conflict, as they are immersed in the European Great Recession. Thus, the first period includes 
the last regional elections that occurred before or in 2010; the second period represents the 
regional elections, which took place after the year 2010 (see Table A4 in the Appendix). For 
some regions, we have data for two electoral cycles. For this reason, the second period has two 
sub-periods: 1st post-2010 and 2nd post-2010, referring to the first and second regional 
elections after the year 2010. 
The transformation of regional spaces of political competition (H1) 
According to our first hypothesis, we should see an increase in the salience of new politics and 
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economic austerity dimensions on the part of at least some establishment parties such that the 
space of political competition is transformed to include those issues in the regional electoral 
agenda. Figure 3 and Table A5 in the Appendix show the evolution of new politics and 
economic austerity salience scores before and after 2010. The salience scores represent average 
values for all parties in the region, excluding new challenger parties. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Let us begin our discussion with the new politics dimension. Out of 13 regions, 11 (85%) 
saw an increase in the level of attention dedicated by establishment parties to issues of 
democratic regeneration, as we expected. In 7 regions (54%), the salience increased by more 
than 1.3 points (our absolute salience yardstick); in the remaining 4 regions (31%), by less than 
1 point. Only 2 regions (15%) saw a u-shaped evolution, by which there was an initial decrease 
in the salience of new politics issues between the last pre-2010 election and the first post-2010 
one, followed by an increase in the second post-2010 electoral cycle. These regions are the 
Basque Country and the Canary Islands. In terms of percentage change, Scotland and Wales 
are the regions where the attention dedicated to democratic regeneration increased the most, 
more than trebling its level in Scotland and more than doubling it in Wales. Their starting levels 
were, however, extremely low (almost 0). The British regions are followed by Galicia, which 
almost doubled the attention paid to democratic regeneration in regional electoral manifestos 
between 2009 and 2012, Catalonia and Veneto. 
Turning now to the economic austerity dimension, only in 2 out of 13 regions the attention 
dedicated to economic austerity issues decreased, growing in the rest of them (85%). A majority 
of the regions (7, or 54%), however, saw only a moderate increase with only 4 regions (31%) 
seeing a growth larger than 1.3 points. In terms of percentage change, the increase was largest 
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in Galicia and Aosta. These regions are followed by the Basque Country and Catalonia. Overall, 
the attention dedicated to democratic regeneration since the emergence of new challenger 
parties shows a larger increase relative to the economic austerity dimension, but both types of 
issues have become more salient after 2010, as expected by our first hypothesis. This is even 
more the case if we compare the increase in the salience of new politics and economic austerity 
issues between the last regional election pre-2010 and the second electoral cycle post-2010. 
Another way to measure the transformation of the regional spaces of political competition 
is by looking at changes in the relative weight of the new politics dimension relative to the other 
two major dimensions, left-right and the centre-periphery (Table 2). When the ratio increases 
from the pre-2010 election to the post-2010 election it is because the new politics dimension is 
gaining relative weight inside the party manifestos in relation to the reference dimension. 
Table 2 shows the different ways in which parties combine new politics issues with the 
other issue dimensions to conform regionally-specific issue packages. In 8 out of 13 regions 
(61.5%), the relative weight of the new politics dimension grows at the expense of both the left-
right and the centre-periphery dimensions: the ratio is larger after 2010 than before. However, 
this ratio is almost always lower than 1, meaning that the reference dimension (left-right or 
centre-periphery) still dominates the new politics dimension in the party manifestos. In terms 
of percentage change, the new politics dimension grows more at the expense of the centre-
periphery than the left-right dimension except in three regions, the Basque Country, Catalonia 
and South Tyrol, the latter being the only region where parties give more weight to centre-
periphery than to left-right issues in relation to democratic regeneration. 
 




Establishment parties versus new challengers (Hypothesis 2) 
Our second hypothesis claims that old establishment parties are more likely to accommodate 
the democratic regeneration agendas of new politics challenger parties indirectly, by 
emphasizing the economic aspects to a larger degree than the more political ones. In this sense, 
we expect all establishment parties to behave similarly. This means that the differences between 
state-wide and regionalist parties with regards to the centre-periphery dimension of competition 
disappear when it comes to the new politics and economic austerity conflict dimensions. Figure 
4 shows the change of new politics, economic austerity and centre-periphery salience scores 
before and after 2010. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Our hypothesis finds no clear confirmation in the data. Establishment parties increase the 
attention paid to new politics and economic austerity issues after 2010, as expected according 
to our first hypothesis. However, there does not seem to be more emphasis on the economic 
austerity dimension at the expense of the new politics one. State-wide parties overall emphasise 
economic austerity more than regionalist parties, but this is the only pattern showed by the data 
in this respect. 
There are, however, other interesting results. The regionalist party family is much more 
heterogeneous after the emergence of these new party challengers. It is clearly divided by the 
new politics conflict dimension. New regionalist parties emphasise new politics and economic 
austerity issues much more than establishment regionalist parties. At the same time, new 
regionalist parties give much less relevance to the centre-periphery dimension than 
establishment regionalist parties, which continue to stick to their old programmatic agendas that 
differentiate them from state-wide parties. Moreover, new regionalist parties also give more 
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salience to new politics and economic austerity issues than new state-wide parties while, they 
simultaneously differ from new state-wide parties in their larger emphasis of centre-periphery 
issues, as is to be expected from regionalist parties. 
In order to delve further into these findings, Table 3 compares the relative weight of the 
new politics dimension relative to the economic austerity, the centre-periphery, and the left-
right dimensions. The ratio between new politics and economic austerity will give us a more 
accurate indicator with which to test our hypothesis than the absolute salience scores. 
Establishment regionalist parties give more relative emphasis to new politics in relation to either 
the economic austerity or the left-right dimension than state-wide parties. The relative emphasis 
of new politics, however, decreases between the pre-2010 and the post-2010 for both party 
families, which seems to go in the direction of our prediction. By contrast, in relation to the 
centre-periphery dimension, establishment state-wide parties emphasise new politics to a much 
larger degree than regionalist parties, and there is no change between electoral cycles. As is to 
be expected, given that new challenger parties bring a new conflict dimension into the space of 
competition, they give much more emphasis to new politics issues than to centre-periphery ones 
in comparison to establishment parties. This applies to both new state-wide parties and new 
regionalist parties. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Concluding remarks 
The main objective of this article was to provide a descriptive answer to the following 
questions: How have establishment parties reacted to the emergence of a new politics agenda 
in regions characterised by complex bi-dimensional political spaces? Has the change in voters’ 
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preferences been picked up and acted upon by regional party systems? What has been the 
response of regionalist parties, the old challengers, to the electoral growth of new politics party 
challengers? The relevance of these questions is two-fold: on the one hand, it fills a gap in the 
literature on the transformation of national political spaces of competition in Europe by looking 
at the sub-national level; on the other hand, it introduces the notion that establishment parties 
can be of two types, state-wide or regionalist, and that both have incentives, as establishment 
parties, to react to the challenge that new politics parties represent. 
Firstly, we have shown that, as expected, regional political spaces of competition have been 
transformed by the emergence and electoral growth of challenger parties with agendas that are 
highly critical of the political establishment. Establishment parties have reacted by partly 
accommodating the agenda of democratic regeneration and economic justice, increasing the 
attention dedicated to these issues in their regional party manifestos. The degree of 
accommodation of the new politics programmatic agenda varies greatly across regions, partly 
because of the type of challenger party, and partly, we assume, because of the diversity of 
regional contexts. Testing this hypothesis, however, went beyond the objectives of this article 
and remains as a task for further exploration. Secondly, we have seen that establishment and 
challenger parties represent two distinct types of party families in relation to the new politics 
conflict dimension. This implies that the regionalist party family is divided by the new politics 
conflict: old regionalist parties continue to emphasise centre-periphery issues more than any 
other type of party whereas new regionalist parties give more relative weight to the new politics 
dimension than to the centre-periphery one. 
Ultimately, our article shows that regionalisation and the presence of a centre-periphery 
cleavage represent no obstacle when it comes to responding to a change of preferences among 
the electorate. The transformation of political spaces in Europe is happening as much, or more, 
at the regional level as at the national one. Meanwhile, the diversity of regional responses as 
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well as the electoral weight and political relevance of challenger parties at the regional level 
negate the secondary nature of regional dynamics. Establishment parties have shown a 
considerable degree of responsiveness to the change of voters’ preferences and their adaptation 
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Table 1. New politics and economic austerity conflict dimensions: operationalisation with RMP 
policy categories. 
Dimension RMP policy category 
New Politics 108 European Integration: Positive 
110 European Integration: Negative 
202 Democracy: Positive  
2024 Representative Democracy: Positive  
2025 Participatory Democracy: Positive 
304 Political Corruption: Negative 
Economic Austerity 401 Free Enterprise: Positive 
403 Market Regulation: Positive 
404 Economic Planning: Positive 
406 Protectionism: Positive 
407 Protectionism: Negative 
409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive 
412 Controlled Economy: Positive 
413 Nationalisation: Positive 
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive 




Table 2. Evolution of the relative weight of each dimension of competition by region (pre- and 
post-2010)  













Aosta Valley 0.34 0.79 0.35 0.89   
Trentino 0.17 0.37 0.22 0.56   
South Tyrol 0.36 0.30 0.43 0.31   
Veneto 0.25 0.56 0.31 2.24   
Scotland 0.03 0.24 0.13 0.56   
Wales 0.15 0.27 0.30 0.62   
Balearic Is. 0.18 0.77 0.20 0.60 0.38 1.22 
Basque C. 0.21 0.67 0.15 0.37 0.21 0.46 
Canary Is. 0.12 0.68 0.08 0.33 0.31 2.04 
Cantabria 0.11 0.52 0.22 1.24 0.09 0.84 
Catalonia 0.14 0.42 0.23 0.36   
Galicia 0.16 0.29 0.19 0.39   




Table 3. The relative weight of the new politics, economic austerity and centre-periphery 
dimensions in regional party manifestos, by type of party (pre- and post-2010).  
 
Ratio new politics/  
economic austerity 
Ratio new politics/ 
left-right 
Ratio new politics/ 
centre-periphery 











Establishment State-wide 0.94 0.92 0.18 0.22 1.17 1.17 
 Regionalist 1.18 1.10 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.26 
Challenger State-wide  2.11  0.57  3.56 






Figure 1. Salience of the major conflict dimensions in new challenger parties’ regional 





Figure 2. New politics versus economic austerity dimensions in challenger parties’ regional 
manifestos (new politics + economic austerity = 100 per cent)* 
 
*Note: The values inside the columns represent each dimension’s absolute salience score relative to the 
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Figure 3. Change in salience score of new politics and economic austerity issues by region (pre-
and post 2010)* 
 
 
*Note: The values indicate the change in issue salience scores between the last electoral turnout before 
2010 and the first after 2010. Where there have been two turnouts after 2010, columns have been 
subdivided in a 1st and a 2nd post 2010 period. For absolute values see table A5 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4. Evolution of the salience of new politics, economic austerity and centre-periphery 
conflict dimensions by type of party (pre- and post-2010)* 
 
*Note: The values indicate absolute salience scores in regional manifestos comparing the last electoral 
turnout before 2010 (first column) and the elections after 2010 (second column). Where there have been 
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Table A1. The RMP categories conforming the centre-periphery and left-right dimensions of 
electoral competition 
The centre-periphery dimension  
 RMP Category Definition 
Centre  C32_YYY(Y) All policy preference categories that come with a 32 code 
(i.e. more competencies for the central state)  
 C21_YYY(Y) All policy preference categories that come with a 21 code 
(i.e. fewer competencies for the peripheral territory) 
 C30_(601, 6015, 
6016, 608) 
Promotion of [state] nation-building policies 
 C20_602 Statements against peripheral nationalism or regionalism. 
 C20_302 + 
C30_302 
General statements against decentralisation. In favour of 
centralisation or re-centralisation at the state level. 
Periphery  C22_YYY(Y) All policy preference categories that come with a 22 code 
(i.e. more competencies for the peripheral territory) 
 C31_YYY(Y) All policy preference categories that come with a 31 code 
(i.e. fewer competencies for the central state) 
 C20_(601, 6015, 
6016, 608) 
Promotion of [regional] nationbuilding policies 
 C30_602 Statements against state nationalism or against the existing 
nation-state 
 C20_(301, 3013, 
3014) + C30_301 
General statements in favour of decentralisation at the 
regional level 
 
The left-right dimension 
Right  Left  
Category Definition Category Definition 
c104 Military: Positive c103 Anti-Imperialism 
c201 Freedom and Human Rights c105 Military: Negative 
c30_203 State Constitutionalism: Pos. c106 Peace 
c305 Political Authority c107 Internationalism: Positive 
c401 Free Enterprise: Positive c202 Democracy 
c402 Incentives: Positive c2024 Representative Democracy: Pos. 
c407 Protectionism: Negative c2025 Participatory Democracy: Positive 
c414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive c403 Market Regulation: Positive 
c505 Welfare State Limitation c404 Economic Planning: Positive 
c507 Education Limitation c406 Protectionism: Positive 
c603 Traditional Morality: Positive c412 Controlled Economy: Positive 
c605 Law and Order: Positive c413 Nationalisation: Positive 





Table A2. Selected parties (new challenger parties in bold) 
Country Region Type Party Abbr. 






Union Valdôtaine Progressiste 
Autonomie Liberté Participation 





State-wide Partito Democratico  
Movimento Cinque Stelle 
PD 
M5S 









State-wide Partito Democratico  
Movimento Cinque Stelle 
PD 
M5S 
 Trentino Regionalist 
 
Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese 
Lega Nord Trentino 
PATT 
LN 
State-wide Partito Democratico  
Movimento Cinque Stelle 
PD 
M5S 
 Veneto Regionalist Lega Nord Veneto LN 
State-wide Partito Democratico  
Movimento Cinque Stelle 
PD 
M5S 
Spain Basque C. Regionalist 
 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
Euskal Herria Bildu 
PNV 
EHB 






 Canary Is. Regionalist Coalición Canaria  CC 






 Cantabria Regionalist Partido Regionalista Cantabro PRC 








 Balearic Is. Regionalist Més per Mallorca – Partit Socialista de 
Mallorca 
Més 








 Catalonia Regionalist 
 
 
Convergència y Unió 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 










 Galicia Regionalist 
 
Bloque Nacionalista Gallego 









 Navarre Regionalist 
 
 
Union del Pueblo Navarro 
Geroa Bai – Nafarroa Bai 










Scotland Regionalist Scottish National Party SNP 




 Wales Regionalist Plaid Cymru PC 
State-wide Labour Party 
Conservative Party 






























Table A3. New challenger parties’ electoral results 2007-2016 
Country Party Year Region % Seats 
Italy Movimento Cinque Stelle 2010 Veneto 2.58 0/51 
2013 Aosta Valley 6.52 2/35 
 South Tyrol 2.5 1/35 
 Trentino 5.72 2/35 
2015 Veneto 10.40 5/51 
Autonomie Liberté Participation Ecologie1 2008 Aosta Valley 12.48 5/35 
2013 Aosta Valley 12.41 5/35 
Union Valdôtaine Progressiste 2013 Aosta Valley 19.21 7/35 
Spain Podemos 2015 Balearic Is. 14.69 10/5 
 Canary Is. 14.53 7/60 
 Cantabria 8.83 3/35 
 Catalonia2 8.94 11/135 
 Navarre 13.67 7/50 
2016 Basque C. 14.76 11/75 
 Galicia3 19.07 14/75 
Ciudadanos 2010 Catalonia 3.40 3/135 
2012 Catalonia 7.56 9/135 
2015 Balearic Is. 5.92 2/59 
 Cantabria 6.62 2/35 
 Catalonia 17.90 25/135 
Candidatura de Unidad Popular  2012 Catalonia 3.47 3/135 
2015 Catalonia 8.21 10/135 
Alternativa Galega de Esquerda 2012 Galicia 13.91 9/75 
Great  
Britain 
United Kingdom Independence Party 2007 Wales 4.0 0/20 
2011 Wales 4.6 0/20 
2016 Wales 13.0 7/20 
1 Coalition, founded as Renouveau Valdôtain in 2008 
2 Catalunya Sí que es Pot (Coalition)  















Table A4. Analysed Elections by Region 
Country Region Elections 
Italy Aosta Valley 2008, 2013 
Trentino 2008, 2013 
South Tyrol 2008, 2013 
Veneto 2010, 2015 
Spain Balearic Islands 2007, 2011, 2015 
Basque Country 2009, 2012, 2016 
Canary Islands 2007, 2011, 2015 
Cantabria 2007, 2011, 2015 
Catalonia 2010, 2012 
Galicia 2009, 2012 
Navarre 2007, 2011, 2015 
Great Britain Scotland 2011, 2016 
Wales 2011, 2016 
Note: Regarding Scotland and Wales, we lack data for the last pre-2010 regional election. Therefore, 
we include the two post-2010 regional elections (2011 and 2016) in our dataset. Although it does not 























Table A5. Evolution of new politics and economic austerity salience in the space of political 
competition by region pre- and post-2010 (standard deviations in brackets)  





















































































Canary Is. 2.18 
(1.43) 
1.48 
(0.22) 
5.56 
(4.14) 
4.00 
(1.53) 
4.44 
(3.71) 
3.46 
(0.90) 
Cantabria 1.59 
(0.35) 
3.07 
(1.14) 
1.87 
(1.86) 
2.83 
(1.11) 
3.42 
(1.97) 
4.93 
(0.65) 
Catalonia 3.15 
(0.54) 
5.14 
(2.23) 
 5.51 
(0.78) 
6.69 
(0.90) 
 
Galicia 2.09 
(0.28) 
4.00 
(1.06) 
 3.86 
(0.94) 
8.16 
(1.38) 
 
Navarre 2.17 
(0.68) 
2.68 
(1.47) 
6.74 
(3.10) 
1.98 
(0.20) 
2.88 
(0.09) 
1.70 
(0.64) 
 
